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Our paper investigates spillover effects across different business segments of publicly traded mutual
fund management companies.  We find that the prior stock price performance of the management company
has a significant impact on the  money flows and the management turnover of the affiliated mutual
funds. Mutual funds managed by poorly performing firms experience unexpectedly low flows of new
money and exhibit a significantly higher attrition of fund managers even if the mutual funds themselves
performed well. Our results remain strong for companies where mutual funds account for only a small
fraction of the overall revenues and hold for both equity and bond mutual funds. These results indicate
that the financial health of a diversified firm has a significant impact on the prospects of the various
business segments.
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Mutual funds are often managed by ﬁnancial ﬁrms that are also active in other business
segments, such as banking and insurance. Such diversiﬁed companies can exhibit spillovers
across the various business segments. Our paper investigates whether the prior stock price
performance of the management company has an impact on the money ﬂows into aﬃliated
mutual funds and the turnover of mutual fund managers.
A relation between the performance of the management company and the activities of the
aﬃliated mutual funds can occur for two primary reasons. First, the performance of the man-
agement company can simply be a reﬂection of the performance of the mutual fund segment.
Companies that manage successful mutual funds might exhibit superior stock price perfor-
mance because the stock price capitalizes the value of the mutual fund sector to the ﬁnancial
conglomerate. It is therefore important to control for the performance of the mutual fund
segment. This direct spillover eﬀect is particularly pronounced for management companies
where the mutual fund segment accounts for a large fraction of the company’s revenues.
Second, indirect spillover eﬀects between the various business segments can aﬀect the
money ﬂows and the management turnover of mutual funds. Poorly performing ﬁrms are
more constrained and might have to reduce the expenditures for all their business segments.
For example, a decrease in the generosity of the compensation to their managers could result
in increased attrition of skilled fund managers, which would justify the money outﬂows. In
addition, poorly performing ﬁrms might also cross-subsidize diﬀerent business segments and
extract resources from their well-performing mutual fund segment. On the other hand, mutual
fund investors could extrapolate irrationally from the performance of the diversiﬁed company
to the mutual fund segment. Thus, investors and fund managers might abandon mutual
funds associated with poorly performing management companies even if the funds themselves
2exhibit superior performance.
To investigate the relation between the stock price performance of management companies
and the money ﬂows and manager turnover of their aﬃliated mutual funds, we collect a sample
of 118 publicly traded companies that manage mutual funds over the period from 1992 to 2009.
Whereas some companies focus their activities on mutual fund management, most companies
derive only a small fraction of their revenues from their mutual fund segments. Comparing
the spillover eﬀects between ﬁrms with diﬀerential dependence on the mutual fund segment
enables us to study in more depth the economic determinants of the spillover eﬀects.
Whereas the impact of prior fund performance on fund ﬂows has received signiﬁcant atten-
tion in the mutual fund literature (e.g., Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Sirri and Tufano (1998),
and Huang, Wei, and Yan (2007)), no papers have studied the impact of the performance of
the management company on fund ﬂows. Our main result shows that the prior management
company performance plays an important role in explaining mutual fund ﬂows. For example,
equity funds aﬃliated with fund companies in the top industry-adjusted performance decile
over the prior 36 months increase their assets under management in the subsequent month by
0.29%. On the other hand, equity funds from companies in the bottom decile lower their assets
by 0.33% in the subsequent month. The importance of company performance as a predictor
of fund ﬂows is robust using alternative performance measures, using alternative evaluation
periods, and after controlling for prior fund performance and other fund characteristics. Thus,
there are important spillovers across diﬀerent divisions of diversiﬁed companies.
We separately study the money ﬂows and the management turnover of both equity and
bond mutual funds. The impact of the stock price performance of the management company
on the money ﬂows for bond mutual funds has a similar economic magnitude as for equity
funds. For example, bond funds aﬃliated with fund companies in the top industry-adjusted
performance decile over the prior 36 months increase their assets under management in the
3subsequent month by 0.14%, whereas bond funds from companies in the bottom decile lower
their assets by 0.23% in the subsequent month. Finding consistent results for both bond and
equity mutual funds strengthens our conﬁdence that the results are not spurious and are not
driven by equity-speciﬁc fundamental factors.
To study the economic reasons for the spillover eﬀects, we separate the mutual funds
companies into two groups by their relative size of the mutual fund segment. If the correlation
between prior stock price performance and fund ﬂows is simply a reﬂection of the performance
of the mutual funds, then we should observe a stronger relation for companies with relatively
large mutual fund segments. On the other hand, if the economic magnitude of the relation
between fund ﬂows and company performance does not depend on the relative size of the
fund segment, then indirect spillover eﬀects are more important in driving this relation. The
mutual fund segment is relatively small for most of the publicly-traded management mutual
fund companies in our sample. The revenues of equity (bond) mutual funds account for only
0.32% (0.14%) of the total revenues of the median management company. Thus, the mutual
fund segment is of minor importance for most management companies. Although the relative
importance of the mutual fund segment diﬀers substantially between below and above median
equity funds (0.11% vs. 9.63% of total company revenues), we ﬁnd that the impact of company
performance on fund ﬂows is almost identical across the two groups of companies. This result
indicates that the relation between ﬂows and company returns is unlikely to simply reﬂect the
superior performance of the mutual funds.
To investigate whether there is a non-linear relation between company performance and
family ﬂows, we estimate whether ﬂows react more to inferior or superior company perfor-
mance. Whereas the mutual fund literature has shown a higher sensitivity to fund performance
for funds with superior performance, we ﬁnd a higher sensitivity to company performance for
ﬁrms with inferior prior performance. This result shows that funds managed by distressed
4companies with poor industry-adjusted stock returns experience signiﬁcantly larger outﬂows
than expected by their prior fund performance. Thus, our results give an indication of the
costs of ﬁnancial distress in ﬁnancial conglomerates.
We also study whether there is an impact of the company performance on the labor market
of mutual fund managers. We ﬁnd a negative relation between manager departures and the
performance of the management company even after controlling for the fund performance.
This result contributes to the mutual fund literature that has shown that the fund performance
has a signiﬁcant impact on fund manager turnover (e.g., Khorana (1996)).
Our ﬁnal question addresses whether the response of fund investors to the company per-
formance is justiﬁed. To answer this question, we estimate the relation between the prior per-
formance of management companies and the subsequent fund performance. Although these
performance predictability tests have limited power, we ﬁnd that funds aﬃliated with poorly
performing management companies tend to exhibit relatively poor subsequent performance.
Thus, fund investors might rationally withdraw funds from poorly performing management
companies in anticipation of inferior subsequent performance.
There is a large mutual fund literature that investigates the impact of fund performance
on money ﬂows and manager turnover.1 Although the relation between the performance of
individual funds and subsequent fund ﬂows has received a lot of attention in the mutual fund
literature, no papers have analyzed the relation between the performance of the management
company and the subsequent money ﬂows and manager turnover.
1Papers on the relation between prior performance and subsequent ﬂows include Ippolito (1992), Brown,
Harlow, and Starks (1996), Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Goetzmann and Peles (1997), Sirri and Tufano
(1998), Koski and Pontiﬀ (1999), Zheng (1999), DelGuercio and Tkac (2002), Lynch and Musto (2003), Berk
and Green (2004), Nanda, Wang, and Zheng (2004), Huang, Wei, and Yan (2007), Ivkovich and Weisbenner
(2009), Spiegel and Zhang (2010), Chapman, Evans, and Xu (2010), Pastor and Stambaugh (2010), and Huang,
Sialm, and Zhang (2011). Papers on the relation between manager turnover and fund performance include
Chevalier and Ellison (1999), Hu, Hall, and Harvey (2000), Khorana (2001), Massa, Reuter, and Zitzewitz
(2010), and Deuskar, Pollet, Wang, and Zheng (2010).
5Whereas the early mutual fund literature has focused on individual mutual funds, several
recent papers have studied the implications of family aﬃliation and the ownership of the
mutual fund families. Massa and Rehman (2008) document that approximately 40% of the
mutual funds between 1990 and 2004 belonged to ﬁnancial conglomerates. The literature
on the economics of mutual fund families has investigated investment strategies, risk taking,
and incentives in families.2 Our paper contributes to this literature by studying the relation
between the past performance of the management company and the future money ﬂows and
management turnover in mutual funds.
Studying the spillovers in mutual fund management companies helps us to better under-
stand the industrial organization of diversiﬁed conglomerates. Oﬀering mutual funds as part
of a ﬁnancial conglomerate has advantages because the mutual fund segment can beneﬁt from
synergies, information spillovers, diversiﬁcation, economies of scope, and easier access to cap-
ital markets. On the other hand, conglomerates have more complex and less transparent
structures and might exacerbate agency problems.3
In addition, our paper also sheds light on the literature discussing the economic costs of
ﬁnancial distress. The corporate ﬁnance literature has indicated that ﬁnancially distressed
ﬁrms might lose their customers and employees. However, it has been diﬃcult to ﬁnd direct
evidence for such spillover eﬀects.4 Our paper provides direct evidence that the stock price
performance of mutual fund management companies has a signiﬁcant impact on the fund
customers (mutual fund ﬂows) and on the fund employees (fund managers) even if the mutual
2Papers in this literature include Khorana and Servaes (1999), Massa (2003), Chen, Hong, Huang, and
Kubik (2004), Nanda, Wang, and Zheng (2004), Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2006), Gervais, Lynch, and Musto
(2006), Ivkovich (2006), Reuter (2006), Kempf and Ruenzi (2008), Massa and Rehman (2008), Bhattacharya,
Lee, and Pool (2010), Evans (2010), and Gallaher, Kaniel, and Starks (2010).
3See the surveys of Stein (2003) and Maksimovic and Philips (2007) for additional information on the
theoretical and empirical literature on conglomerates.
4See the surveys by Parsons and Titman (2008) and Graham and Leary (2011) for reviews of the literature
on capital structure and corporate strategy.
6fund segment accounts for a very small fraction of the total company revenues.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the construction
of our database and summarizes the distribution of the various variables. Sections 3 and 4
study the relation between management company performance and fund ﬂows for stock and
bond funds. Section 5 describes the relation between company performance and fund man-
ager turnover. Finally, Section 6 investigates whether the sensitivity of fund ﬂows to the
management company performance is justiﬁed by subsequent diﬀerences in fund performance.
2 Data and Summary Statistics
We describe in this section the sample construction and report some key summary statistics.
2.1 Sample Construction
The data on mutual funds is obtained from the survivorship bias-free mutual fund database
provided by the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). We focus on the period
between January 1992 to December 2009, for which management company information is
available. The ﬁrst sample includes all diversiﬁed U.S. equity funds. We exclude specialized
sector funds, international funds and balanced funds.5 The second sample includes all tax-
able U.S. government and corporate bonds funds. We exclude municipal bond funds since
these funds are tax-exempt and cannot be compared directly with taxable bond funds. We
also exclude money market funds and bond funds with more than 50% holdings in equity
securities.6
Mutual funds must further satisfy the following criteria: First, the management company
5Funds with Lipper objective codes EI, EIEI, ELCC, G, GI, LCCE, LCGE, LCVE, MC, MCCE, MCGE,
MCVE, MLCE, MLGE, MLVE, MR, SCCE, SCGE, SCVE, and SG are retained as equity funds.
6Bond funds with Lipper objective codes A, BBB, GB, GI, GUT, GUS, HY, IID, IUG, MSI, SID, SII, SIU,
SUS, SUT, and USM are retained.
7is publicly traded or a subsidiary of a publicly traded company. Second, the funds must have
non-missing management company names, non-missing monthly total net assets, non-missing
turnover and expense ratios, and non-missing Lipper investment objective codes. Third, the
funds must have at least 24 months of non-missing returns.
From the CRSP mutual fund database, we obtain the names of management companies
and their corresponding management codes. Using these names, we manually search through
the CRSP stock database to ﬁnd the CUSIPs of the corresponding publicly traded stocks. To
take into account mergers aﬀecting management companies or their parents, we extract a list of
mergers from the SDC Platinum database and assign the funds to the merged companies after
the eﬀective date of the mergers. Using the matched CUSIPs, we obtain monthly stock returns
of management companies or their publicly-traded parent companies (if the management
company is a subsidiary) from the stock ﬁles provided by CRSP. We ﬁnd that 91.4% of
mutual funds in our sample share the same names as their parent company.
We use Compustat to obtain annual revenues of the management company and the CRSP
mutual fund database to obtain management fees for each fund which allow us to compute
the dependency of the management company on revenues generated by its fund management
segment. To examine fund manager turnover, we receive from Morningstar the identities of
managers and their starting and ending dates at the respective funds.
Overall, our mutual fund sample includes 6,102 equity funds and 3,155 bond funds after
applying our selection criteria. For most of our analyses, we separately aggregate the equity
and the bond funds oﬀered by each management company. These mutual funds are aﬃliated
with 118 publicly traded fund management companies. These identiﬁed fund families account
for 71% of the assets under management in the mutual fund sector.
82.2 Summary Statistics
This section explains the construction of the variables used in our study and reports some key
summary statistics.
2.2.1 Management Company Performance
We measure the performance of a management company using the industry-adjusted stock
returns. We ﬁrst employ the 48 industry classiﬁcation by Fama and French to sort management
companies into industries according to their SIC codes.7 We then obtain the value-weighted
portfolio returns for each industry from Kenneth French’s website and compute management
company performance as the average of its industry-adjusted returns (CR) over the past
12, 24, and 36 months, respectively. We require a company to have at least 12 months of
available data to compute the industry-adjusted returns. As investors are more likely to
react to persistent rather than transient management company performance, a 36-month time
horizon allows us to better capture the longer term performance of a ﬁrm. However, a 12-
month performance allows us to examine shorter term sensitivity of investors to management
company performance.
As robustness tests, we use alternative measures of management company performance.
Instead of using industry-adjusted returns, we use the raw average returns of management
companies (CRR) or the risk-adjusted returns according to the Fama-French-Carhart four
factor model (CFFR). To obtain the Fama-French-Carhart risk-adjusted returns, we estimate
the OLS factor loadings of funds on a rolling basis using 24 months of company returns. The
risk-adjusted company return over the prior 12, 24, and 36 months (CFFR) is obtained by
averaging the diﬀerences between the actual monthly fund returns and the expected fund
7The 48 industry classiﬁcation is available from Kenneth French’s website:
(http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/index.html).
9returns using the estimated betas. The factor loadings of company j are computed using the
Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model (FFM):
Rj,t − RTB,t = αj,t + β
M
j,t(RM,t − RTB,t) + β
SMB
j,t (RS,t − RB,t)
+β
HML
j,t (RH,t − RL,t) + β
UMD
j,t (RU,t − RD,t) + ￿j,t. (1)
The return of company j during time period t is denoted by Ri,t. The index M corresponds
to the market portfolio and the index TB to the risk-free Treasury bill rate. Portfolios of
small and large stocks are denoted by S and B, respectively; portfolios of stocks with high
and low ratios between their book values and their market values are denoted by H and L,
respectively; and portfolios of stocks with relatively high and low returns during the previous
year are denoted by U and D, respectively. The Carhart (1997) model nests the CAPM
model (which includes only the market factor) and the Fama and French (1993) model (which
includes the size and the book-to-market factors in addition to the market factor).
Panel A of Table 1 reports the characteristics of companies that oﬀer equity mutual funds.8
The average management company in our equity sample experiences an industry-adjusted
return of 0.25% per month over the prior 12 months. The publicly traded companies in the
sample exhibit signiﬁcant variation in their average monthly industry-adjusted performance, as
reﬂected by the standard deviation of 2.67%. The mean raw return of management companies
equals 1.28% per month over the prior 12 months and the mean four-factor adjusted return
equals 0.37% per month. Whereas the ﬁrst three rows list the moments of the mean company
performance over the prior 12 months, the subsequent three rows list the moments of the
standard deviations of the company performance over the prior 12 months. We also compute
the moments of the company performance over the prior 24 and 36 months. The distribution
of these moments is not summarized for brevity.
8The characteristics of management companies diﬀer slightly across the equity and the bond samples
because not all management companies oﬀer both bond and equity funds over all time periods.
10To obtain an impression of the importance of the mutual fund revenues relative to the
total revenues of management companies, we compute for each fund in each year the dollar
amount of management fees as the product of the annual management fees listed in the CRSP
mutual fund database and the average of the total monthly net assets over the past 12 months.
Using annual revenues obtained from Compustat, we sum the dollar management fees across
all member funds under the same management company and divide by the company’s annual
revenue to obtain the revenue percentage (REV PCT). As the management fee data are
only available from 1998 onwards, the analyses involving REV PCT are restricted to the
sub-sample period 1998-2009. For the equity (bond) funds sample, REV PCT measures the
revenue derived from the management of equity (bond) funds in our sample only.9
Mutual funds account for a relatively small fraction of the revenues for most management
companies. The management fees of equity (bond) mutual funds account on average for
only 4.90% (1.13%) of the revenues of the management companies. Half of our management
companies have management fees from equity (bond) mutual funds that are below 0.32%
(0.14%) of their total revenues. In some of our analyses, we focus on these companies with
below median revenue dependencies.
2.2.2 Mutual Fund Variables
Since most of our analyses are performed at the management company level, we aggregate
ﬂows into each fund family separately for bond funds and equity funds. First, we sum the
monthly new money (dollar) ﬂows into each fund family following Zheng (1999) and Nanda,
Wang, and Zheng (2004). The monthly new money ﬂow into each family is deﬁned as the
dollar change in the monthly total net asset value (TNA) minus the price appreciation of
9Our results are not aﬀected qualitatively if we use the expense ratio as a proxy for the fund revenues
instead. The expense ratio is available over the whole time period but might include revenues that do not
accrue to the management company.
11family assets over the month (R). Assuming that new money is invested at the end of each
month, new money ﬂow into family f in month t is deﬁned as:
FLOWf,t = TNAf,t − TNAf,t−1(1 + Rf,t), (2)
where Rf,t is the weighted-average investor return of all equity or bond mutual funds of a
family and TNAf,t is the sum of the total net asset values of all equity or bond mutual funds
of the management company. To obtain the new money growth rate for fund family f in month






Panel B of Table 1 summarizes the results for the equity fund sample and Panel C sum-
marizes the results for the bond fund sample. To remove outliers, we winsorize NMG at the
1% and 99% levels. The mean mutual fund family experiences an inﬂow of 0.05% per month
for their equity funds and 0.03% for their bond funds. The distribution of the new money
growth is skewed to the right as the median is smaller than the mean.
The ﬂows to a mutual fund family are aﬀected by the aggregate ﬂows to the mutual fund
sector. Individual fund families are likely experiencing fund inﬂows in periods where the
aggregate mutual fund ﬂows are large. Spiegel and Zhang (2010) suggest using changes in
market share to capture changes in the competitive environment of mutual funds. The change



















12For equity funds, we compute the risk-adjusted returns of all member funds within the
fund family using the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model as described in equation (1).
We use rolling OLS regressions to estimate the factor loadings over the prior 24 months.
The risk-adjusted return FRi,t of fund i in month t is computed by averaging the diﬀerence
between the fund return and the expected return using the estimated Fama-French-Carhart
factor loadings. This method eliminates young funds with fewer than 24 trading months. The
family abnormal returns are computed by taking the TNA-weighted averages of the individual
abnormal returns. The mean monthly four-factor adjusted return of equity mutual funds in
a family equals -0.12% over the prior 12 months. Fund families diﬀer signiﬁcantly in the
performance of their equity mutual funds. The interquartile range of the mean equity four-
factor adjusted fund family return over the prior 12 months equals [-0.34%, 0.07%].
An alternative method to control for the performance of mutual funds is to adjust the fund
return for the median return of funds with the same investment styles. Thus, we adjust the
returns of each member fund by the median return of funds within the same Lipper investment
objective code, value-weight these adjusted fund returns by the prior TNAs, and sum these
weighted adjusted returns across all member funds to obtain the monthly style-adjusted fund
returns in a family. We then average the style-adjusted returns over the prior 12, 24 and 36
months to obtain the style-adjusted fund return FSAR.
Equity funds in our sample outperformed the median Lipper fund in the same objective
code on average by 0.02% over the prior 12 months, whereas bond funds underperformed
the median Lipper fund in the same objective code on average by -0.01%. Not surprisingly,
the cross-sectional deviation of fund performance diﬀers more for equity funds than for bond
funds. The interquartile range of the mean style-adjusted fund return over the prior 12 months
equals [-0.21%, 0.24%] for equity funds and [-0.07%, 0.09%] for bond funds.
To capture the strategy chosen by the fund family, we follow Nanda, Wang, and Zheng
13(2004) in constructing (i) a cross-sectional standard deviation of the abnormal fund returns
(Std.Dev.FR), (ii) an indicator variable (STARf,t) that indicates the presence of at least one
member fund with a ﬁve-star rating by Morningstar within the family, and (iii) the number of
member funds in the family (NUMFDSf,t). In each month, the cross-fund return standard
deviation is constructed as the standard deviation of the abnormal risk-adjusted returns (or
investment objective-adjusted returns) of all member funds within fund family. The mean
cross-fund standard deviation for equity funds is 1.36% using four-factor adjusted returns.
The cross-sectional standard deviation of bond funds is lower and equals 0.53% for style-
adjusted returns. Fund families in our sample manage on average 25.11 equity funds and
14.48 bond funds and around 36% of families manage a star equity fund, whereas 29% of
families manage a star bond fund. Following extant studies, we also control for the size,
the turnover ratio, and the expense ratio at the fund family level. The family turnover and
expense ratio is computed by aggregating the TNA-weighted measures at the individual fund
level across all member funds. Equity mutual funds have an average turnover of around 70%
and charge an expense ratio of 1.14%. The turnover of bond funds equals around 134% and
their expense ratio equals 0.90%.
2.2.3 Management Turnover
To examine if the management company performance is a potential determinant of individual
fund manager’s departure, we ﬁrst match the list of manager names obtained from Morningstar
to our sample funds using the fund’s CUSIP. As not all of our sample funds from CRSP have
non-missing CUSIPs and some funds with available CUSIPs are not covered in the list of funds
with manager names from Morningstar, we have a reduced sample of funds for the analyses
pertaining to management turnover. Thus, we only have available fund manager data for
1,203 equity funds and for 633 bond funds.
14To identify managers who leave the fund, we compare the ending date of each manager to
the last trading date of the fund. If the ending date of the manager precedes the last trading
date of the fund, we assign a DEPART indicator variable to unity, and zero otherwise. Note
that we do not know the reason for departures and cannot distinguish whether the manager
is forced to quit or leaves voluntarily. However, we exclude forced departures due to fund
mergers and liquidations. For funds with multiple managers, we consider that there is a
departure if at least one manager leaves in any month. In each month, we further compute
the manager’s tenure (TENURE) at the fund using the current date minus the starting date
of the manager. For funds with multiple managers, we use the average tenure across all
managers of the fund. The average tenure equals 48 months for an equity manager and 49
months for a bond manager. We also keep track of whether mutual funds are team managed
or single managed. Team managed funds account for 60% of equity funds and 57% of bond
funds.
3 Flows of Equity Mutual Funds
In this section, we analyze whether the performance of the management company aﬀects
the ﬂows into equity mutual funds. Individual investors might avoid holding mutual funds
aﬃliated with companies that performed poorly. On the other hand, funds aﬃliated with
management companies with a good reputation might beneﬁt. Since the performance of the
management company might reﬂect the performance of its mutual funds, it is important to
control for the performance of the funds. In addition, we also study subsamples of management
companies, where the mutual funds account for a very small portion of the overall revenues
of the publicly traded ﬁrms.
153.1 Univariate Relation
To obtain a ﬁrst impression of the relation between ﬁrm performance and mutual fund ﬂows,
we sort management companies monthly into deciles according to their industry-adjusted
performance over the prior 12, 24, and 36 months. Panel A of Figure 1 depicts the new money
growth rates over the subsequent month of equity funds managed by companies in diﬀerent
performance deciles.
Our main result shows that the prior management company performance plays an im-
portant role in explaining mutual fund ﬂows. For example, equity funds aﬃliated with fund
companies in the top industry-adjusted performance decile over the prior 36 months increase
their assets under management in the subsequent month by 0.29%. On the other hand, equity
funds from companies in the bottom decile lower their assets under management by 0.33%
in the subsequent month. Since the prior company performance is measured over a rela-
tively long time period, the composition of the decile portfolios remains very stable over time
and the fund ﬂows persist over extended time periods. These results indicate that company
performance has a signiﬁcant impact on fund ﬂows.
3.2 Bivariate Summary Statistics
To investigate whether the results are robust after controlling for fund performance, we double-
sort funds according to their management company and their fund performance. We sort man-
agement companies monthly into quartiles according to their industry-adjusted performance
over the prior 12, 24, and 36 months, respectively. We independently sort the management
companies into quartiles according to the four-factor adjusted performance of their equity
mutual funds. The mean family ﬂows to equity funds are reported in Table 2. The rows
correspond to companies with diﬀerent stock performance and the columns correspond to
companies with diﬀerent mutual fund performance. The standard errors are double-clustered
16by time and management company following Petersen (2009).
Panel A1 of Table 2 reports the mean monthly new money growth rates for funds sorted
according to the fund and company performance levels over the prior 12 months. Consistent
with the prior literature, we ﬁnd that families with superior fund performance exhibit higher
net ﬂows. In addition, we also ﬁnd that funds of management companies with superior per-
formance also attract signiﬁcantly higher ﬂows even after keeping fund performance constant.
The inﬂows into funds of top quartile management companies exceed the net inﬂows of bottom
quartile management companies by between 0.12 (for bottom quartile fund performers) and
0.46 percentage points (for second quartile fund performers) per month.
The economic and statistical signiﬁcance of the results increases substantially if we lengthen
the prior performance horizon, as shown in Panels A2 and A3. For example, the ﬂow diﬀerence
between top and bottom management company performance quartiles ranges between 0.48
and 0.60 percentage points using a 24-month performance window. In this case, all the ﬂow
diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant at a one percentage point level.
By sorting the families into quartiles according to their fund performance, we already con-
trol for the variation of contemporaneous fund performance across the four fund performance
groups. To study whether there is additional variation in fund performance within the four
groups, we report in Panels B1-B3 the average four-factor adjusted fund returns over the pre-
vious 12, 24, and 36 months. The fund performance increases when we move across columns
simply because the fund families are sorted according to the fund performance. However, we
ﬁnd very little additional variation in the fund performance within the four FR quartiles. For
example, the return diﬀerences between the fourth and the ﬁrst CR quartiles in Panel B1
are eﬀectively zero for the two interior portfolios FR2 and FR3, which exhibited in Panel A1
the largest diﬀerences in fund ﬂows. This result indicates that the stock price performance of
management companies is primarily driven by diﬀerent factors than the performance of the
17aﬃliated mutual funds. Thus, the sensitivity of ﬂows to company performance summarized
in Panels A1-A3 is unlikely driven by contemporaneous diﬀerences in fund performance.
3.3 Multivariate Regressions
To explore in more depth the impact of the company’s performance on equity ﬂows, we use
multivariate OLS regressions including time ﬁxed eﬀects. We cluster the standard errors by
both time and management company:
NMGf,t = β0,t + β1CRf,t−1 + β2FRf,t−1 + β3Std.Dev.CRf,t−1 (6)
+ β4Std.Dev.FRf,t−1 + β5LOG(TNAf,t−1) + β6TOf,t−1
+ β7EXPf,t−1 + β8LOG(1 + NUMFDSf,t−1) + β9STARf,t−1 + ￿f,t,
where CR is the industry-adjusted return of the management company, FR is the four-
factor adjusted return of the equity mutual funds in a fund family, Std.Dev.CR is the time-
series standard deviation of CR, Std.Dev.FR is the cross-sectional standard deviation of
the fund-speciﬁc four-factor adjusted returns within a fund family, TNA is the total assets
under management for the equity mutual funds of the management company, TO is the
average turnover, EXP is the average expense ratio, NUMFDS is the number of equity
funds managed by the fund family, and STAR is an indicator variable of whether the fund
family manages a ﬁve-star equity fund following Nanda, Wang, and Zheng (2004). We expect
β1 to be positive if the stock performance of the management company attracts ﬂows into the
fund family after controlling for fund performance and other fund characteristics.10
The ﬁrst three columns of Table 3 report the coeﬃcient estimates using four-factor ad-
justed fund returns. A one percentage point increase in the industry-adjusted performance of
10Whereas our paper analyzes the impact of performance on ﬂows, a related literature has studied the
impact of ﬂows on fund returns. Gruber (1996), Edelen (1999), Zheng (1999), Wermers (2003), Coval and
Staﬀord (2007), Chen, Hanson, Hong, and Stein (2008), Zhang (2008), Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2010),
and Lou (2009) provide evidence that mutual fund ﬂows have an impact on subsequent fund performance.
18the management company increases the new money growth rate by between 0.080 and 0.158
percentage points per month, depending on whether we measure performance over the prior
12 or prior 36 months. Consistent with Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Sirri and Tufano (1998),
and Huang, Wei, and Yan (2007) we ﬁnd that prior abnormal fund performance has also a
signiﬁcant impact on fund ﬂows. When interpreting the economic magnitude of company and
fund returns, it is important to take into account that the standard deviation of the company
return is around ﬁve times larger than the standard deviation of the risk-adjusted fund re-
turn. For example, a one-standard deviation increase in the performance of the management
company CR during the prior 36 months (which amounts to 1.82%) increases the ﬂows into
equity funds in the subsequent month by 0.29 percentage points. Similarly, a one-standard de-
viation increase in the performance of the mutual fund FR during the prior 36 months (which
amounts to 0.41%) increases the ﬂows into equity funds in the subsequent month also by 0.29
percentage points. The coeﬃcient estimates on the management company performance remain
economically and statistically signiﬁcant if we use the raw fund return (middle three columns)
or the style-adjusted returns (last three columns) to control for the fund performance. Thus,
the impact of the company performance has an economically meaningful impact on the fund
ﬂows.
Consistent with Nanda, Wang, and Zheng (2004) we ﬁnd that families that manage star
equity funds attract signiﬁcant new money ﬂows. The remaining control variables are less
important in explaining fund ﬂows.
In the base case results, the new money growth is taken in the month immediately subse-
quent to the 12, 24, and 36 month return window. In an unreported robustness test we ﬁnd
that the results are almost identical if we include a time gap of one month. Thus, the results
are not driven by short-term factors that might aﬀect fund ﬂows.
The new money growth rate is fairly persistent over time. In an unreported robustness
19test, we ﬁnd that the company performance remains statistically signiﬁcant if we include the
lagged new money growth rate as one additional explanatory variable.
Finally, the results are very similar using a Fama and MacBeth (1973) methodology. In this
speciﬁcation, we ﬁrst estimate cross-sectional regressions of new money growth on company
performance, fund performance, and the other control variables. In a second stage, we average
the cross-sectional coeﬃcients over the 203 months and compute Newey-West standard errors
using a lag length of 12. For example, the Fama-MacBeth coeﬃcient using a 24 month
performance window equals 0.168 with a standard error of 0.040, which is very similar to the
corresponding coeﬃcient of 0.158 (0.043) in the pooled regression.
Table 4 shows that the results are also robust using alternative measures of the performance
of the management companies. The diﬀerent sets of columns show the results using industry-
adjusted company returns, raw company returns, and four-factor adjusted company returns.
The fact that the results are almost identical for industry-adjusted company returns as for
raw company returns indicates that the results are driven by ﬁrm-speciﬁc and not by macro-
economic industry factors.
3.4 Piecewise Linear Speciﬁcation
To examine whether the performance-ﬂow relation is non-linear, we estimate the sensitivity
of fund ﬂows separately for underperforming and outperforming funds:
NMGf,t = β0,t + β1Min(CRf,t−1,0) + β2Max(CRf,t−1,0) + β3Min(FRf,t−1,0) + (7)
+ β4Max(FRf,t−1,0) + β5Std.Dev.CRf,t−1 + β6Std.Dev.FRf,t−1 + β7LOG(TNAf,t−1)
+ β8TOf,t−1 + β9EXPf,t−1 + β10LOG(1 + NUMFDSf,t−1) + β11STARf,t−1 + ￿f,t.
The ﬁrst three columns of Table 5 use the four-factor adjusted fund returns and the
last three columns use the style-adjusted fund returns. Although the slope coeﬃcients are
20positive for both segments, the coeﬃcients are usually more signiﬁcant for underperforming
funds. Fund management companies that perform poorly relative to their peers tend to
experience lower inﬂows. Thus, the impact of company performance appears to be particularly
pronounced for fund companies that experience poor stock performance and are ﬁnancially
distressed. In contrast, we ﬁnd that fund ﬂows are generally more sensitive to positive fund
performance than to negative fund performance, especially if we also take into account the
impact of star performers.
3.5 Revenue Dependance
A relation between the performance of the management company and the activities of the
aﬃliated mutual funds can occur due to direct and indirect spillover eﬀects. On the one hand,
the performance of the management company might simply be a reﬂection of the performance
of the mutual fund segment. Companies that manage successful mutual funds might exhibit
superior stock price performance because the stock price capitalizes the value of the mutual
fund sector to the conglomerate. This direct spillover eﬀect would be particularly pronounced
for management companies where the mutual fund segment accounts for a large fraction of the
company’s revenues. On the other hand, indirect spillover eﬀects between the various business
segments could aﬀect the money ﬂows and the management turnover of mutual funds.
To address this question, we repeat the previous analysis separately for management com-
panies with low (below sample median) and high (above sample median) revenue dependency
on the fund management businesses. As reported in Table 1, the median percentage share
of revenues from equity mutual funds is just 0.32% of the total revenues of the fund man-
agement companies. The revenue percentage due to equity funds diﬀers signiﬁcantly across
the two subsamples. Whereas below median families generate on average only 0.11% of their
revenues from equity mutual funds, above median families generate on average 9.63% of their
21revenues from the equity mutual funds. Thus, it is unlikely that the fund performance would
have a substantial direct impact on the stock price performance of management companies
with below median revenue percentages. This result also conﬁrms the low contemporaneous
correlation between fund and company returns reported in Panels B1-B3 of Table 2.
Table 6 shows that the results are similar across the two subsamples. For example, a
ten percentage point increase in the average industry-adjusted company performance over
the prior 36 months increases the monthly ﬂows by 1.80 percentage points for below median
revenue percentage companies and by 1.95 percentage points for above median companies.
Thus, our results are not just driven by companies where mutual funds are their main revenue
source. Since the management fee is not available over the whole time period, the sample size
decreases from 11,951 to 8,992 observations. However, in unreported results, we ﬁnd similar
results if we form the two subsamples according to the expense ratio, which is available over
the whole sample period.
3.6 Subperiod Analysis
To study whether the results are robust over diﬀerent time periods and economic environments,
we divide our sample into subperiods. To economize on space, we only report the results using
the fund and company performance over the prior 24 months. The ﬁrst two columns of Table 7
report the results over the 1992-2000 and the 2001-2009 subperiods. The last two columns
divide the sample by the economic environment as proxied by an indicator variable for NBER
recessions.11 Overall, we ﬁnd slightly stronger results over the 2001-2009 subperiod and during
NBER recessions.
11The NBER recession dates are available from http://www.nber.org.
223.7 Changes in Market Share
Following Spiegel and Zhang (2010), we use the change in the market share to capture changes
in the competitive environment of mutual funds. The results summarized in Table 8 indicate
that the performance of the management company has a signiﬁcant impact on the change
in the market share of mutual fund families. Well-performing fund management companies
increase their market share.
3.8 Individual Fund Level Analysis
The previous analyses are performed at the management company level. As a robustness test,
we examine in Table 9 the impact of the management company performance on the new money
growth into individual funds while controlling for lagged individual fund characteristics such
as fund size, expenses, turnover ratio, fund age, and whether the fund is a star fund. The ﬁrst
three columns use the four-factor adjusted fund performance as a control variable and the
last three columns use the style-adjusted fund performance as a control variable. To control
for cross-correlation in the residuals, we cluster the standard errors by time and management
company. The results are not aﬀected substantially using this alternative estimation method.
The performance of the management company continues to have a signiﬁcant impact on the
ﬂows into the company’s equity funds.
3.9 Index Funds
The spillover eﬀects between the management company and the mutual funds could be caused
by changes in the perception of the investment ability of fund managers. For example, in-
vestors might withdraw money from poorly performing management companies because they
anticipate that the investment ability of the fund managers might deteriorate. Deterioration
of investment ability of the fund managers should matter less to investors of index funds since
23these funds are passively managed. To investigate this hypothesis, we compute the relation
between management company performance and the ﬂows into index funds. Unfortunately,
focusing on passively managed funds reduces our sample size from 11,951 to 3,133 observa-
tions and reduces the power of our tests. The coeﬃcient on the industry-adjusted 36-month
performance β1 from equation (4) equals 0.078 for the index fund sample, whereas the corre-
sponding coeﬃcient equals 0.158 for the actively managed fund sample. These results indicate
that about half of the eﬀect of company performance carries over to index funds.
3.10 Investor Clienteles
The sensitivity of fund ﬂows to company performance might depend on the clienteles of mutual
funds. Mutual funds oﬀered through deﬁned contribution (DC) retirement plans might exhibit
diﬀerent sensitivity to ﬁrm performance than funds oﬀered directly to investors. We obtain
annual data on the size of the mutual fund assets held in the DC accounts from the 1997-
2010 Pensions & Investments surveys of mutual fund families following Christoﬀersen, Geczy,
Musto, and Reed (2006) and Sialm and Starks (2011). Unfortunately, we only have data on
the proportion of DC assets for 34% of our sample. Using this restricted sample, we do not
ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the relation between company performance and
fund ﬂows between above and below median DC funds.
4 Flows of Bond Mutual Funds
In the previous section, we relate returns of the equity securities of fund management com-
panies to the ﬂows of their equity mutual funds. It is possible that the equity securities of
the management companies might be aﬀected by the same fundamental factors as the equity
funds. To alleviate this concern, we study in this subsection the relation between ﬂows into
ﬁxed-income mutual funds and the stock performance of fund management companies.
244.1 Univariate Relation
The univariate relation between ﬁrm performance and bond fund ﬂows is reported in Panel
B of Figure 1. Consistent with the equity fund results, we ﬁnd that the ﬂows into bond
funds are positively related to the prior performance of the aﬃliated management company.
Whereas bond funds aﬃliated with management companies in the lowest ﬁve performance
deciles using a 36-month window experience outﬂows, funds in the highest ﬁve performance
deciles experience inﬂows. Furthermore, bond funds in the top performance decile over the
prior 36 months attract ﬂows of 0.14 percentage points per month, whereas funds in the
bottom decile lose ﬂows of 0.23 percentage points.
4.2 Bivariate Summary Statistics
To study the relation between ﬂows into bond mutual funds and the stock performance of
fund management companies, we sort management companies into 16 groups according to the
style-adjusted performance of the ﬁxed-income mutual funds of a management company and
according to the industry-adjusted stock return of the management company. The sorting into
quartiles is performed independently across the two dimensions. The performance measures
of the bond mutual funds and the management company stocks are measured over the prior
12, 24, and 36 months.
Panels A1 to A3 of Table 10 show that bond funds attract higher inﬂows of new money if
the stock of their management company outperforms their industry peers. The ﬂow diﬀerence
between top and bottom performing management companies ranges between 0.11 and 0.42
percentage points per month for the four bond fund performance quartiles using a 12-month
performance window. The magnitude of the results increases if we sort funds based on the
returns over the prior 24 and 36 months. Although the results are not as strongly statistically
signiﬁcant as for equity funds, we ﬁnd qualitatively similar eﬀects for both types of funds.
25Consistent with the bivariate sorts on equity funds, we do not ﬁnd a strong contempora-
neous correlation between the prior industry-adjusted company returns and the contempora-
neous style-adjusted bond fund returns, as shown in Panels B1-B3.
4.3 Multivariate Regressions
Table 11 shows that the performance of the management company over the prior 24 and 36
months has a signiﬁcant impact on the subsequent ﬂows into bond mutual funds after control-
ling for the prior style-adjusted bond fund performance and other fund characteristics. The
results are not sensitive to whether we measure the performance of the management com-
pany relative to their industry peers, the raw return, or the four-factor adjusted management
company performance.12
The results on both bond and equity mutual funds indicate that the performance of the
parent company has an impact on the perception of the clients. Mutual fund investors of
poorly performing mutual fund companies tend to withdraw funds at an accelerated rate even
if the mutual funds themselves experience relatively superior fund performance.
5 Management Turnover
Poorly performing companies do not just lose some of their customers, as demonstrated in
the previous two sections, they might also lose some of their key employees. In this section,
we investigate whether the prior performance of the management company has an impact on
the turnover of fund managers.
Khorana (1996) ﬁnds that fund’s past returns and asset growth predict turnover of man-
agers. We adjust a fund’s returns by the median value of funds with the same investment
12In unreported results, we show that the relation between bond ﬂows and the performance of the manage-
ment company stock remains signiﬁcant if we control for the style-adjusted performance of an individual bond
mutual fund instead of aggregating all bond mutual funds at the family level.
26objective code and average the adjusted returns over 36 months. These measures are then
used as proxies for managerial ability.
To examine whether the management company performance is a predictor of managerial
turnover after controlling for the performance and other fund characteristics, we estimate a
logit model with standard errors clustered by the fund management company:
DEPARTf,t = β0,t + β1CRf,t−1 + β2FRf,t−1 (8)
+ β3LOG(TNAf,t−1) + β4LOG(AGEf,t−1) + β5TOf,t−12 + β6EXPf,t−12
+ β7STARf,t−1 + β8LOG(TENUREf,t−1) + β9LOG(TEAMf,t−1) + ￿f,t,
where DEPART is an indicator variable that takes on unity if any manager at fund f departs
in month t, and zero otherwise. We run this speciﬁcation separately for equity and bond funds
including time ﬁxed eﬀects.
Khorana (1996) ﬁnds that higher turnover of the fund predicts managerial departure and
attributes this ﬁnding to the tendency of managers to window-dress by churning the fund’s
holdings excessively. We control for the fund’s turnover ratio (TO), its size (TNA), and its
age (AGE). Berk and Green (2004) argue that managers with higher ability will extract rents
in the form of expenses charged to investors. Therefore, we also control for the fund’s expense
ratio (EXP). A star fund rating can provide certiﬁcation for the fund manager’s ability and
aﬀects manager turnover. Thus, we also include a STAR dummy that indicates whether the
fund has a star rating in the previous month. Lastly, we control for the tenure of the fund
manager and whether the fund is team managed.
The ﬁrst three columns report the results for equity mutual funds and the last three
columns report the results for bond mutual funds. Although not all results are statistically
signiﬁcant, we observe that companies with worse stock price performance generally experience
a higher attrition of managers. In addition, we ﬁnd higher turnover levels in larger fund
27families, for managers with shorter tenure, and for team managed funds.
6 Subsequent Fund Performance
Fund investors might rationally withdraw funds from poorly performing management com-
panies in anticipation of inferior subsequent performance. To study whether the response of
fund investors to the company performance is justiﬁed, we again sort management companies
into 16 groups according to the fund and the management company performance. Table 13
summarizes in Panel A the four-factor adjusted equity fund returns and in Panel B the style-
adjusted bond fund returns in the subsequent month.
Whereas the prior fund performance has signiﬁcant predictability, we ﬁnd less pronounced
predictability using the company performance. Panel A shows that equity funds that exhibit
the lowest prior fund and the lowest prior company performance exhibit the worst performance
over the subsequent month. Whereas the average equity fund exhibits a four-factor alpha of
-0.13% per month, funds in the lowest fund and company performance quartile exhibit a
four-factor alpha of -0.26%. The performance diﬀerence between the highest and the lowest
company performance quartiles is statistically signiﬁcant for the two lower fund performance
quartiles, but is insigniﬁcant for the two higher fund performance quartiles. The results are
weaker for bond funds. It must be kept in mind that the performance predictability tests
have limited power due to the large standard errors in our limited sample of fund families. In
addition, the performance results could also be muted since the fund ﬂows might be suﬃciently
large to eliminate a signiﬁcant amount of performance predictability as suggested by Berk
and Green (2004). Overall, our results indicate that the withdrawals from poorly performing
mutual funds might be justiﬁed due to the relatively poor subsequent performance of funds
aﬃliated with distressed management companies.
287 Conclusions
We investigate whether there are important spillover eﬀects across diﬀerent business segments
of publicly traded ﬁrms that also manage mutual funds. We ﬁnd that the prior stock price
performance of the conglomerate has a signiﬁcant impact on the money ﬂows and the man-
agement turnover of the aﬃliated mutual funds. Mutual funds managed by poorly performing
ﬁrms experience unexpectedly low ﬂows of new money and exhibit a signiﬁcantly higher at-
trition of talented fund managers even if the mutual funds themselves perform well. The
economic magnitude of the relation between ﬁrm performance and money ﬂows is similar in
magnitude to the well-established relation between fund performance and money ﬂows. These
results indicate that the ﬁnancial health of a conglomerate has a signiﬁcant impact on the
prospects of the various business segments. Our results also shed light on the economic costs
of ﬁnancial distress. Diversiﬁed companies that experience poor stock price performance tend
to lose customers and key employees even in business segments that exhibit superior perfor-
mance. On the other hand, business segments do not appear to beneﬁt to a proportional
degree if their parent company exhibits superior stock market performance.
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Figure 1: Money Flows to Mutual Funds by Management Company Performance
These ﬁgures depict the relation between management company performance deciles and new
money growth for equity and bond funds, where the industry-adjusted management company
performance is measured over the prior 12, 24, and 36 months.Table 1: Summary Statistics of Mutual Funds
This table presents summary statistics for both equity and bond funds. The sample period is from
January 1992 to December 2009.
Panel A: Fund Management Companies
Variables Mean Std.Dev. 25th Perc Median 75th Perc
CR (Industry-Adjusted Return; 12 Mths; in %) 0.25 2.67 -1.08 0.12 1.37
CRR (Raw Return; 12 Mths; in %) 1.28 3.03 -0.12 1.35 2.77
CFFR (Four-Factor Adjusted Return; 12 Mths; in %) 0.37 2.52 -0.94 0.23 1.51
Std. Dev. CR (12 Mths, in %) 7.64 5.09 4.61 6.21 9.20
Std. Dev. CRR (12 Mths, in %) 8.69 5.76 5.23 7.20 10.31
Std. Dev. CFFR (12 Mths, in %) 7.66 4.92 4.77 6.36 8.96
REVPCT Equity Funds (Revenue Percent) 4.90 12.38 0.09 0.32 1.86
REVPCT Bond Funds (Revenue Percent) 1.13 4.98 0.03 0.14 0.47
Panel B: Equity Mutual Funds
Variable Mean Std.Dev. 25th Perc Median 75th Perc
NMG (New Money Growth; in %) 0.05 2.81 -1.03 -0.14 0.85
CMKTS (Change in Market Share; in 1000s) -0.01 0.34 -0.04 -0.00 0.02
PCMKTS (Percent Change in Market Share; in %) -0.23 3.15 -1.65 -0.34 1.07
FR (Four-Factor Adjusted Return; 12 Mths; in %) -0.12 0.49 -0.34 -0.13 0.07
FRR (Raw Return; 12 Mths; in %) 0.56 1.64 -0.24 0.86 1.58
FSAR (Style-Adjusted Return; 12Mths; in %) 0.02 0.62 -0.21 0.02 0.24
Std. Dev. FR (12 Mths; in %) 1.36 1.05 0.74 1.15 1.73
Std. Dev. FRR (12 Mths; in %) 1.76 1.44 0.88 1.43 2.26
Std. Dev. FSAR (12 Mths; in %) 1.48 1.23 0.74 1.19 1.88
NUMFDS (Number of Funds) 25.11 34.97 3 9 33
STAR (Star Fund) 0.36 0.48 0 0 1
TNA (Total Net Assets; in $M) 9,094 17,723 247 1,342 9,850
TO (Turnover; in %) 70.30 51.39 36.50 61.87 86.50
EXP (Expense Ratio; in %) 1.14 0.37 0.96 1.14 1.33
Panel C: Bond Mutual Funds
Variable Mean Std.Dev. 25th Perc Median 75th Perc
NMG (New Money Growth; in %) 0.03 3.14 -1.16 -0.19 1.03
CMKTS (Change in Market Share; in 1000s) -0.01 0.43 -0.06 -0.00 0.03
PCMKTS (Percent Change in Market Share; in %) -0.07 3.77 -1.70 -0.37 1.22
FSAR (Style-Adjusted Return; 12Mths; in %) -0.01 0.33 -0.07 0.01 0.09
FRR (Raw Return; 12 Mths; in %) 0.44 0.69 0.19 0.48 0.77
Std. Dev. FSAR (12 Mths; in %) 0.53 0.65 0.17 0.35 0.66
Std. Dev. FRR (12 Mths; in %) 1.15 1.22 0.37 0.78 1.51
NUMFDS (Number of Funds) 14.48 16.87 3 7 21
STAR (Star Fund) 0.29 0.45 0 0 1
TNA (Total Net Assets; in $M) 4,714 13,475 179 833 5,059
TO (Turnover; in %) 133.94 119.37 54.00 95.24 183.02
EXP (Expense Ratio; in %) 0.90 0.30 0.72 0.86 1.07
34Table 2: Equity Fund Flows by Management Company Performance (CR) and
Equity Fund Performance (FR)
The table independently sorts management companies into quartiles by their prior industry-adjusted
stock returns (CR) and by the four-factor adjusted return of their equity funds (FR). Panels A1, A2,
and A3 summarize the mean new money growth rates in the subsequent month based on the fund and
company performance over the prior 12, 24, and 36 months. The family fund ﬂows are computed for
each of the 16 groups as the average percentage new money growth rates (NMG). Panels B1, B2, and
B3 summarize the mean four-factor adjusted return of the mutual funds over the prior 12, 24, and
36 months. The sample period ranges from January 1992 to December 2009. The standard errors
of the diﬀerences are clustered by time and management company and are shown in parentheses. *,
**, and *** represent statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Panel A1: New Money Growth (12 Month Performance)
ALL FR 1 FR 2 FR 3 FR 4 4-1
ALL −0.52 0.00 0.12 0.82 1.34∗∗∗
(0.08)
CR 1 −0.02 −0.61 −0.22 −0.03 0.76 1.37∗∗∗
(0.16)
CR 2 0.10 −0.50 −0.02 0.10 0.80 1.30∗∗∗
(0.15)
CR 3 0.08 −0.49 −0.01 0.17 0.67 1.16∗∗∗
(0.16)
CR 4 0.26 −0.49 0.25 0.26 1.03 1.52∗∗∗
(0.16)
4-1 0.29∗∗∗ 0.12 0.46∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗ 0.26
(0.07) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.18)
Panel A2: New Money Growth (24 Month Performance)
ALL FR 1 FR 2 FR 3 FR 4 4-1
ALL −0.54 −0.03 0.17 0.77 1.31∗∗∗
(0.07)
CR 1 −0.16 −0.90 −0.32 −0.14 0.72 1.62∗∗∗
(0.16)
CR 2 0.02 −0.58 −0.07 0.07 0.67 1.25∗∗∗
(0.14)
CR 3 0.10 −0.38 −0.01 0.27 0.49 0.87∗∗∗
(0.19)
CR 4 0.40 −0.30 0.26 0.46 1.20 1.50∗∗∗
(0.16)
4-1 0.56∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.15) (0.17) (0.13) (0.17)
Panel A3: New Money Growth (36 Month Performance)
ALL FR 1 FR 2 FR 3 FR 4 4-1
ALL −0.54 −0.07 0.29 0.72 1.26∗∗∗
(0.08)
CR 1 −0.12 −0.78 −0.31 −0.04 0.65 1.43∗∗∗
(0.15)
CR 2 0.04 −0.59 −0.19 0.35 0.60 1.19∗∗∗
(0.14)
CR 3 0.12 −0.37 0.11 0.28 0.48 0.85∗∗∗
(0.15)
CR 4 0.36 −0.41 0.12 0.57 1.17 1.58∗∗∗
(0.17)
4-1 0.48∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.16) (0.14) (0.13) (0.17)
35Panel B1: Fund Abnormal Returns over Prior 12 Months
ALL FR 1 FR 2 FR 3 FR 4 4-1
ALL −0.59 −0.24 −0.04 0.31 0.90∗∗∗
(0.04)
CR 1 −0.15 −0.61 −0.24 −0.04 0.29 0.91∗∗∗
(0.05)
CR 2 −0.14 −0.60 −0.23 −0.04 0.32 0.92∗∗∗
(0.04)
CR 3 −0.15 −0.61 −0.24 −0.04 0.28 0.90∗∗∗
(0.04)
CR 4 −0.13 −0.55 −0.24 −0.05 0.33 0.88∗∗∗
(0.05)
4-1 0.02 0.06∗ 0.00 0.00 0.04
(0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04)
Panel B2: Fund Abnormal Returns over Prior 36 Months
ALL FR 1 FR 2 FR 3 FR 4 4-1
ALL −0.50 −0.21 −0.06 0.23 0.73∗∗∗
(0.04)
CR 1 −0.14 −0.53 −0.22 −0.06 0.25 0.78∗∗∗
(0.05)
CR 2 −0.14 −0.51 −0.21 −0.05 0.22 0.73∗∗∗
(0.04)
CR 3 −0.14 −0.49 −0.21 −0.06 0.20 0.70∗∗∗
(0.04)
CR 4 −0.14 −0.49 −0.21 −0.06 0.24 0.73∗∗∗
(0.05)
4-1 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.00 −0.01
(0.03) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05)
Panel B3: Fund Abnormal Returns over Prior 36 Months
ALL FR 1 FR 2 FR 3 FR 4 4-1
ALL −0.47 −0.20 −0.07 0.21 0.68∗∗∗
(0.04)
CR 1 −0.14 −0.53 −0.20 −0.07 0.25 0.78∗∗∗
(0.06)
CR 2 −0.13 −0.46 −0.20 −0.06 0.20 0.67∗∗∗
(0.04)
CR 3 −0.13 −0.44 −0.20 −0.07 0.17 0.62∗∗∗
−0.03
CR 4 −0.12 −0.45 −0.20 −0.07 0.22 0.67∗∗∗
(0.06)
4-1 0.02 0.08∗ 0.00 0.00 −0.03
(0.03) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.07)
36Table 3: Equity Fund Flows by Management Company Performance: Alternative Fund Performance
Measures
This table uses OLS regressions to examine the relation between stock performance of management companies and aggregate
fund ﬂows into diversiﬁed U.S. equity funds managed by these companies. The dependent variable is family-level new money
growth (NMG) in month t. The stock price performance of management companies is measured using the average industry-
adjusted returns over the prior 12, 24, and 36 months (CR). FR is the average four-factor adjusted equity fund returns, the
average raw equity fund returns, or the average investment objective-adjusted equity fund returns over the prior 12, 24, and
36 months. Std.Dev.CR is the time-series standard deviation of CR. Std.Dev.FR is the cross-sectional standard deviation
of the fund-speciﬁc performance within a fund family. TNA is the family-level monthly total net assets value. TO is the
TNA-weighted turnover ratio at the family-level. EXP is the TNA-weighted expense ratio at the family-level. NUMFDS
is the number of equity funds for the management company. STAR is an indicator variable that takes on unity if the family
has at least one member fund rated as a star fund. The sample period is from January 1992 to December 2009. Time
dummies are included. Standard errors are clustered by time and management companies. All independent variables are
lagged by one month. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent statistical signiﬁcance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Dependent Variable: Monthly Family Flows (NMG)
Four-Factor Adjusted Raw Style- Adjusted
Fund Return Fund Return Fund Return
12 Mths 24 Mths 36 Mths 12 Mths 24 Mths 36 Mths 12 Mths 24 Mths 36 Mths
CR 0.080∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.043) (0.049) (0.024) (0.041) (0.047) (0.023) (0.041) (0.047)
FR 0.804∗∗∗ 0.780∗∗∗ 0.712∗∗∗ 0.629∗∗∗ 0.557∗∗∗ 0.452∗∗∗ 0.877∗∗∗ 1.080∗∗∗ 1.053∗∗∗
(0.145) (0.187) (0.212) (0.095) (0.118) (0.115) (0.118) (0.170) (0.201)
Std. Dev. CR 0.003 0.024 0.035 0.005 0.024 0.035 0.003 0.021 0.033
(0.018) (0.026) (0.032) (0.017) (0.025) (0.030) (0.017) (0.025) (0.030)
Std. Dev. FR 0.032 0.027 0.024 0.036 0.040 0.046 0.093∗∗ 0.078∗ 0.079∗
(0.048) (0.048) (0.049) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.043) (0.043) (0.044)
LOG(TNA) 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
TO −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.002 −0.002 −0.002 −0.002 −0.002 −0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
EXP 0.123 0.031 −0.007 0.097 0.027 −0.002 0.074 −0.019 −0.063
(0.243) (0.224) (0.220) (0.232) (0.213) (0.209) (0.232) (0.212) (0.207)
LOG(1+NUMFDS) −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.001 −0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
STAR 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 11,951 11,951 11,951 11,980 11,980 11,980 11,951 11,951 11,951
R-Squared 0.093 0.097 0.092 0.101 0.102 0.096 0.109 0.114 0.106
3
7Table 4: Equity Fund Flows by Management Company Performance: Alternative Company Perfor-
mance Measures
This table uses OLS regressions to examine the relation between stock performance of management companies and aggregate
fund ﬂows into diversiﬁed U.S. equity funds managed by these companies. The dependent variable is family-level new money
growth (NMG) in month t. The stock price performance of management companies is measured using the average industry-
adjusted returns, the average raw returns, and the average four-factor adjusted returns over the prior 12, 24, and 36 months
(CR). FR is the average four-factor adjusted equity fund returns over the prior 12, 24, and 36 months. Std.Dev.CR is the
time-series standard deviation of CR. Std.Dev.FR is the cross-sectional standard deviation of the fund-speciﬁc performance
within a fund family. TNA is the family-level monthly total net assets value. TO is the TNA-weighted turnover ratio at the
family-level. EXP is the TNA-weighted expense ratio at the family-level. NUMFDS is the number of equity funds for the
management company. STAR is an indicator variable that takes on unity if the family has at least one member fund rated
as a star fund. The sample period is from January 1992 to December 2009. Time dummies are included. Standard errors
are clustered by time and management companies. All independent variables are lagged by one month. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Dependent Variable: Monthly Family Flows (NMG)
Industry-Adjusted Raw Four-Factor- Adjusted
Company Return Company Return Company Return
12 Mths 24 Mths 36 Mths 12 Mths 24 Mths 36 Mths 12 Mths 24 Mths 36 Mths
CR 0.080∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗ 0.126∗∗ 0.126∗∗
(0.024) (0.043) (0.049) (0.027) (0.050) (0.055) (0.031) (0.050) (0.059)
FR 0.804∗∗∗ 0.780∗∗∗ 0.712∗∗∗ 0.797∗∗∗ 0.768∗∗∗ 0.701∗∗∗ 0.998∗∗∗ 1.158∗∗∗ 1.205∗∗∗
(0.145) (0.187) (0.212) (0.145) (0.189) (0.212) (0.167) (0.245) (0.298)
Std. Dev. CR 0.003 0.024 0.035 0.004 0.018 0.024 0.020 0.040 0.053
(0.018) (0.026) (0.032) (0.015) (0.024) (0.029) (0.022) (0.032) (0.036)
Std. Dev. FR 0.032 0.027 0.024 0.031 0.028 0.026 0.037 0.033 0.029
(0.048) (0.048) (0.049) (0.048) (0.048) (0.049) (0.051) (0.051) (0.053)
LOG(TNA) 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
TO −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
EXP 0.123 0.031 −0.007 0.124 0.047 0.018 0.089 0.031 −0.003
(0.243) (0.224) (0.220) (0.245) (0.229) (0.229) (0.265) (0.250) (0.246)
LOG(1+NUMFDS) −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.002∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
STAR 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 11,951 11,951 11,951 11,980 11,980 11,980 11,956 11,956 11,956
R-Squared 0.093 0.097 0.092 0.092 0.094 0.09 0.097 0.099 0.097
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8Table 5: Equity Fund Flows by Management Company Performance: Piecewise
Linear Regression
This table uses OLS regressions to examine the relation between stock performance of management
companies and aggregate fund ﬂows into diversiﬁed U.S. equity funds managed by these companies.
The dependent variable is family-level new money growth (NMG) in month t. The industry-adjusted
performance of the management company (CR) and the four-factor adjusted performance of the
equity mutual funds (FR) are divided into two piece-wise linear terms. The performance is measured
over the past 12, 24, and 36 months. Std.Dev.CR is the time-series standard deviation of CR.
Std.Dev.FR is the cross-sectional standard deviation of the fund-speciﬁc performance within a fund
family. TNA is the family-level monthly total net assets value. TO is the TNA-weighted turnover
ratio at the family-level. EXP is the TNA-weighted expense ratio at the family-level. NUMFDS
is the number of equity funds for the management company. STAR is an indicator variable that
takes on unity if the family has at least one member fund rated as a star fund. The sample period
is from January 1992 to December 2009. Time dummies are included. Standard errors are clustered
by time and management companies. All independent variables are lagged by one month. Standard
errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% level, respectively.
Dependent Variable: Monthly Family Flows (NMG)
Four-Factor Adjusted Fund Return Style-Adjusted Fund Return
12 Mths 24 Mths 36 Mths 12 Mths 24 Mths 36 Mths
Min(CR, 0) 0.087∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗ 0.062 0.157∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.056) (0.065) (0.039) (0.053) (0.064)
Max(CR, 0) 0.075∗ 0.136∗ 0.119 0.068∗ 0.122 0.105
(0.040) (0.076) (0.080) (0.038) (0.075) (0.078)
Min(FR, 0) 0.828∗∗ 0.634 0.111 0.745∗∗∗ 0.878∗∗∗ 0.905∗∗∗
(0.376) (0.438) (0.413) (0.191) (0.269) (0.271)
Max(FR, 0) 0.794∗∗∗ 0.840∗∗∗ 0.949∗∗∗ 1.009∗∗∗ 1.284∗∗∗ 1.200∗∗∗
(0.163) (0.211) (0.265) (0.184) (0.296) (0.348)
Std. Dev. CR 0.004 0.027 0.041 0.002 0.024 0.038
(0.014) (0.023) (0.031) (0.014) (0.022) (0.029)
Std. Dev. FR 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LOG(TNA) −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.002 −0.002 −0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
TO 0.134 0.050 0.023 0.098 0.006 −0.038
(0.237) (0.221) (0.219) (0.229) (0.206) (0.204)
EXP 0.032 0.029 0.028 0.095∗∗ 0.079∗ 0.082∗
(0.048) (0.048) (0.049) (0.043) (0.043) (0.044)
LOG(1+NUMFDS) −0.003∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.002∗ −0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
STAR 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 11,951 11,951 11,951 11,951 11,951 11,951
R-squared 0.094 0.097 0.094 0.109 0.115 0.107
39Table 6: Equity Fund Flows by Management Company Performance and Fund
Performance: Subsamples by Revenue Percentage
This table uses OLS regressions to examine the relation between stock performance of management
companies and aggregate fund ﬂows into diversiﬁed U.S. equity funds managed by these companies.
The equity funds are partitioned into two groups according to the management company’s revenue
dependency (REV PCT) in the previous year. REV PCT is the percentage of revenues of the
management company that is generated from management of U.S. equity mutual funds, and is
computed as the product of the annual management fees multiplied by average family TNA over the
12 months in the year and divided by total revenues of the management company. The dependent
variable is family-level new money growth (NMG) in month t. The stock price performance of
management companies is measured using the average industry-adjusted returns over the prior 12,
24, and 36 months (CR). FR is the average four-factor adjusted equity fund returns over the past
12, 24, and 36 months. Std.Dev.CR is the time-series standard deviation of CR. Std.Dev.FR is
the cross-sectional standard deviation of the fund-speciﬁc performance within a fund family. TNA
is the family-level monthly total net assets value. TO is the TNA-weighted turnover ratio at the
family-level. EXP is the TNA-weighted expense ratio at the family-level. NUMFDS is the number
of equity funds for the management company. STAR is an indicator variable that takes on unity if
the family has at least one member fund rated as a star fund. The sample period is from January
1998 to December 2009. Time dummies are included. Standard errors are clustered by time and
management companies. All independent variables are lagged by one month. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses. *, **, *** represent statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively.
Dependent Variable: Monthly Family Flows (NMG)
Below Median Revenue Percentage Above Median Revenue Percentage
12 Mths 24 Mths 36 Mths 12 Mths 24 Mths 36 Mths
CR 0.062∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.045) (0.064) (0.037) (0.061) (0.062)
FR 0.692∗∗∗ 0.736∗∗∗ 0.597∗ 0.932∗∗∗ 1.043∗∗∗ 1.064∗∗∗
(0.200) (0.259) (0.322) (0.223) (0.299) (0.377)
Std. Dev. CR 0.001 0.038 0.041 −0.002 0.007 0.024
(0.025) (0.034) (0.039) (0.018) (0.029) (0.045)
Std. Dev. FR 0.095 0.098 0.095 −0.050 −0.069 −0.084
(0.087) (0.086) (0.086) (0.074) (0.076) (0.075)
LOG(TNA) 0.003∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
TO 0.000 0.001 0.001 −0.004 −0.004 −0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
EXP 0.224 0.127 0.075 0.440 0.322 0.247
(0.304) (0.302) (0.303) (0.478) (0.395) (0.355)
LOG(1+NUMFDS) −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗ −0.003∗ −0.002 −0.002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
STAR 0.008∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 4,506 4,506 4,506 4,486 4,486 4,486
R-Squared 0.084 0.093 0.088 0.150 0.156 0.154
40Table 7: Equity Fund Flows by Management Company Performance and Fund
Performance: Time Subsamples
This table uses OLS regressions to examine the relation between stock performance of management
companies and aggregate fund ﬂows into diversiﬁed U.S. equity funds managed by these companies.
The sample is divided into subsamples based on the time period (1992-2000 and 2001-2009) and based
on the economic environment as proxied by an indicator variable for NBER recessions. The dependent
variable is family-level new money growth (NMG) in month t. The stock price performance of
management companies is measured using the average industry-adjusted returns over the prior 24
months (CR). FR is the average four-factor adjusted equity fund returns over the past 24 months.
Std.Dev.CR is the time-series standard deviation of CR. Std.Dev.FR is the cross-sectional standard
deviation of the fund-speciﬁc performance within a fund family. TNA is the family-level monthly
total net assets value. TO is the TNA-weighted turnover ratio at the family-level. EXP is the
TNA-weighted expense ratio at the family-level. NUMFDS is the number of equity funds for the
management company. STAR is an indicator variable that takes on unity if the family has at least
one member fund rated as a star fund. Time dummies are included. Standard errors are clustered
by time and management companies. All independent variables are lagged by one month. Standard
errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** represent statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% level, respectively.
Dependent Variable: Monthly Family Flows (NMG)
Subperiods Economic Environment
1992- 2001- NBER NBER
2000 2009 Recessions Booms
CR 0.095∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.050) (0.050) (0.045)
FR 1.096∗∗∗ 1.030∗∗∗ 0.679∗∗ 1.122∗∗∗
(0.257) (0.211) (0.318) (0.182)
Std. Dev. CR −0.018 0.026 0.045∗∗∗ 0.016
(0.027) (0.026) (0.017) (0.028)
Std. Dev. FR 0.085∗ 0.017 0.034 0.087∗∗
(0.048) (0.072) (0.098) (0.044)
LOG(TNA) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
TO 0.000 −0.003 0.000 −0.002
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
EXP 0.227 −0.223 −0.712∗ 0.072
(0.364) (0.282) (0.389) (0.220)
LOG(1+NUMFDS) 0.000 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
STAR 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Constant −0.011 −0.004 0.003 −0.009∗
(0.010) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005)
Observations 4,266 7,685 1,768 10,183
R-squared 0.124 0.107 0.100 0.117
41Table 8: Equity Fund Flows by Management Company Performance and Fund
Performance: Change in Market Share
This table uses OLS regressions to examine the relation between stock performance of management
companies and aggregate market share of diversiﬁed U.S. equity funds managed by these companies.
The dependent variable is either the family-level change in the market share or the percentage
change in the market share in month t. The market share is deﬁned as the total value of equity funds
managed by a family divided by the total value of all equity funds. The stock price performance of
management companies is measured using the average industry-adjusted returns over the prior 12,
24, and 36 months (CR). FR is the average four-factor adjusted equity fund returns over the past
12, 24, and 36 months. Std.Dev.CR is the time-series standard deviation of CR. Std.Dev.FR is
the cross-sectional standard deviation of the fund-speciﬁc performance within a fund family. TNA
is the family-level monthly total net assets value. TO is the TNA-weighted turnover ratio at the
family-level. EXP is the TNA-weighted expense ratio at the family-level. NUMFDS is the number
of equity funds for the management company. STAR is an indicator variable that takes on unity if
the family has at least one member fund rated as a star fund. The sample period is from January
1992 to December 2009. Time dummies are included. Standard errors are clustered by time and
management companies. All independent variables are lagged by one month. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses. *, **, *** represent statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively.
Dependent Variable:
Change in Market Share x100 Percentage Change in Market Share
12 Mths 24 Mths 36 Mths 12 Mths 24 Mths 36 Mths
CR 0.083∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.057) (0.074) (0.024) (0.044) (0.052)
FR 0.664∗∗∗ 0.750∗∗∗ 0.837∗∗ 0.928∗∗∗ 0.851∗∗∗ 0.766∗∗∗
(0.219) (0.286) (0.353) (0.182) (0.228) (0.257)
Std. Dev. CR −0.017 −0.016 −0.018 0.012 0.034 0.045
(0.014) (0.018) (0.022) (0.018) (0.026) (0.032)
Std. Dev. FR −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 0.017 0.013 0.009
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054)
LOG(TNA) −0.003∗∗ −0.003∗∗ −0.003∗∗ 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
TO 0.112 0.068 0.054 −0.002 −0.002 −0.002
(0.212) (0.217) (0.222) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
EXP −0.07 −0.072 −0.076 0.032 −0.066 −0.101
(0.053) (0.053) (0.054) (0.263) (0.246) (0.243)
LOG(1+NUMFDS) −0.002 −0.001 −0.001 −0.002∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.002∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
STAR 0.007∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 11,951 11,951 11,951 11,951 11,951 11,951
R-Squared 0.033 0.035 0.035 0.098 0.098 0.094
42Table 9: Equity Fund Flows by Management Company Performance and Fund
Performance: Individual Fund Analysis
This table uses OLS regressions to examine the relation between stock performance of management
companies and fund ﬂows into diversiﬁed U.S. equity funds managed by these companies. The
dependent variable is fund-level new money growth (NMG) in month t. The stock price performance
of management companies is measured using the average industry-adjusted returns over the prior
12, 24, and 36 months (CR). FR is the average four-factor adjusted equity fund return or the
style-adjusted fund return over the past 12, 24, and 36 months. Std.Dev.CR is the time-series
standard deviation of CR. Std.Dev.FR is the cross-sectional standard deviation of the fund-speciﬁc
performance within a fund family. TNA is the monthly total net assets value of a fund. TO is the
turnover ratio at the fund level. EXP is the expense ratio at the fund level. AGE is the time period
in months since the inception of the fund. STAR is an indicator variable that takes on unity if the
fund is rated as a star fund in the previous month, and zero otherwise. The sample period is from
January 1992 to December 2009. Time dummies are included. Standard errors are clustered by time
and management companies. All independent variables are lagged by one month. Standard errors
are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
level, respectively.
Dependent Variable: Monthly Fund Flows (NMG)
Four-Factor Adjusted Fund Return Style-Adjusted Fund Return
12 Mths 24 Mths 36 Mths 12 Mths 24 Mths 36 Mths
CR 0.048∗∗ 0.075∗∗ 0.073∗∗ 0.049∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.029) (0.033) (0.019) (0.031) (0.036)
FR 1.533∗∗∗ 1.955∗∗∗ 2.158∗∗∗ 1.280∗∗∗ 1.647∗∗∗ 1.890∗∗∗
(0.106) (0.151) (0.168) (0.104) (0.132) (0.146)
Std. Dev. CR −0.002 0.006 0.009 −0.002 0.004 0.006
(0.010) (0.014) (0.018) (0.011) (0.015) (0.018)
Std. Dev. FR 0.064 −0.019 −0.054 0.123∗∗∗ 0.081∗ 0.046
(0.070) (0.091) (0.095) (0.042) (0.046) (0.049)
LOG(TNA) −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
TO 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
EXP −0.984∗∗∗ −0.939∗∗∗ −0.918∗∗∗ −1.022∗∗∗ −0.985∗∗∗ −0.955∗∗∗
(0.119) (0.121) (0.121) (0.117) (0.118) (0.118)
Log(Age) −0.002 −0.001 −0.001 −0.002 −0.002 −0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
STAR 0.024∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 301,121 301,121 301,121 301,121 301,121 301,121
R-squared 0.054 0.056 0.055 0.059 0.06 0.06
43Table 10: Bond Fund Flows by Management Company Performance (CR) and
Bond Fund Performance (FSAR)
The table independently sorts management companies into quartiles by their prior industry-adjusted
stock returns (CR) and by the style-adjusted return of their bond funds (FSAR). Panels A1, A2, and
A3 summarize the mean new money growth rates in the subsequent month based on the fund and
company performance over the prior 12, 24, and 36 months. The family fund ﬂows are computed for
each of the 16 groups as the average percentage new money growth rates (NMG). Panels B1, B2, and
B3 summarize the mean style-adjusted return of the bond mutual funds over the prior 12, 24, and
36 months. The sample period ranges from January 1992 to December 2009. The standard errors
of the diﬀerences are clustered by time and management company and are shown in parentheses. *,
**, and *** represent statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Panel A1: New Money Growth (12 Month Performance)
ALL FSAR 1 FSAR 2 FSAR 3 FSAR 4 4-1
ALL −0.33 0.08 0.03 0.55 0.88∗∗∗
(0.10)
CR 1 −0.02 −0.50 0.12 −0.11 0.41 0.91∗∗∗
(0.19)
CR 2 0.11 −0.05 −0.10 0.14 0.43 0.48∗∗∗∗
(0.17)
CR 3 0.05 −0.38 0.08 −0.05 0.54 0.92∗∗∗
(0.18)
CR 4 0.20 −0.38 0.24 0.13 0.83 1.21∗∗∗
(0.17)
4-1 0.22∗∗ 0.11 0.13 0.24 0.42∗∗
(0.10) (0.17) (0.21) (0.19) (0.18)
Panel A2: New Money Growth (24 Month Performance)
ALL FSAR 1 FSAR 2 FSAR 3 FSAR 4 4-1
ALL −0.38 0.00 0.11 0.65 1.03∗∗∗
(0.10)
CR 1 −0.12 −0.67 −0.03 0.02 0.19 0.86∗∗∗
(0.18)
CR 2 0.11 −0.13 0.01 0.07 0.47 0.59∗∗∗
(0.18)
CR 3 0.10 −0.33 −0.06 −0.01 0.80 1.12∗∗∗
(0.17)
CR 4 0.29 −0.41 0.09 0.36 1.13 1.54∗∗∗
(0.19)
4-1 0.41∗∗∗ 0.27∗ 0.12 0.34∗ 0.95∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.16) (0.17) (0.20) (0.20)
Panel A3: New Money Growth (36 Month Performance)
ALL FSAR 1 FSAR 2 FSAR 3 FSAR 4 4-1
ALL −0.35 0.00 0.07 0.56 0.91∗∗∗
(0.10)
CR 1 −0.14 −0.54 0.04 −0.23 0.17 0.71∗∗∗
(0.19)
CR 2 −0.02 −0.26 −0.17 0.00 0.35 0.61∗∗∗
(0.17)
CR 3 0.08 −0.25 −0.01 −0.01 0.59 0.83∗∗∗
(0.17)
CR 4 0.36 −0.36 0.13 0.53 1.13 1.49∗∗∗
(0.19)
4-1 0.50∗∗∗ 0.18 0.09 0.76∗∗∗ 0.96∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.20)
44Panel B1: Fund Style-Adjusted Returns over Prior 12 Months
ALL FSAR 1 FSAR 2 FSAR 3 FSAR 4 4-1
ALL −0.29 −0.03 0.05 0.24 0.53∗∗∗
(0.05)
CR 1 −0.03 −0.37 −0.03 0.05 0.25 0.62∗∗∗
(0.11)
CR 2 0.01 −0.24 −0.03 0.05 0.23 0.47∗∗∗
(0.04)
CR 3 0.00 −0.25 −0.02 0.06 0.23 0.48∗∗∗
(0.04)
CR 4 0.01 −0.29 −0.02 0.06 0.26 0.55∗∗∗
(0.05)
4-1 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.04) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03)
Panel B2: Fund Style-Adjusted Returns over Prior 24 Months
ALL FSAR 1 FSAR 2 FSAR 3 FSAR 4 4-1
ALL −0.21 −0.02 0.04 0.19 0.39∗∗∗
(0.03)
CR 1 −0.01 −0.25 −0.02 0.04 0.20 0.44∗∗∗
(0.07)
CR 2 0.02 −0.16 −0.02 0.04 0.20 0.36∗∗∗
(0.03)
CR 3 0.00 −0.21 −0.02 0.04 0.17 0.37∗∗∗
(0.03)
CR 4 0.01 −0.20 −0.02 0.04 0.19 0.38∗∗∗
(0.03)
4-1 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.00 −0.01
(0.03) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03)
Panel B3: Fund Style-Adjusted Returns over Prior 36 Months
ALL FSAR 1 FSAR 2 FSAR 3 FSAR 4 4-1
ALL −0.17 −0.02 0.03 0.16 0.34∗∗∗
(0.03)
CR 1 0.01 −0.20 −0.02 0.04 0.20 0.40∗∗∗
(0.05)
CR 2 0.02 −0.13 −0.02 0.03 0.17 0.30∗∗∗
(0.03)
CR 3 0.00 −0.15 −0.02 0.04 0.13 0.29∗∗∗
(0.02)
CR 4 0.00 −0.19 −0.01 0.03 0.16 0.35∗∗∗
(0.04)
4-1 −0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 −0.04
(0.02) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02)
45Table 11: Bond Fund Flows by Management Company Performance and Fund Performance
This table uses OLS regressions to examine the relation between the stock performance of management companies and
aggregate fund ﬂows into U.S. bond funds managed by these companies. The dependent variable is family-level new money
growth (NMG) into bond funds in month t. The stock price performance of management companies is measured using
the average industry-adjusted returns, the average raw returns, and the four-factor adjusted returns over the prior 12, 24,
and 36 months. FSAR is the average investment objective-adjusted bond fund return over the past 12, 24, and 36 months.
Std.Dev.CR is the time-series standard deviation of CR. Std.Dev.FR is the cross-sectional standard deviation of the fund-
speciﬁc performance within a fund family. TNA is the family-level monthly total net assets value. TO is the TNA-weighted
turnover ratio at the family-level. EXP is the TNA-weighted expense ratio at the family-level. NUMFDS is the number
of bond funds for the management company. STAR is an indicator variable that takes on unity if the family has at least one
fund rated as a star fund. The sample period is from January 1992 to December 2009. Time dummies are included. Standard
errors are clustered by time and management companies. All independent variables are lagged by one month. Standard errors
are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** represent statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Dependent Variable: Monthly Fund Flows (NMG)
Industry-Adjusted Raw Four-Factor Adjusted
Company Return Company Return Company Return
12 Mths 24 Mths 36 Mths 12 Mths 24 Mths 36 Mths 12 Mths 24 Mths 36 Mths
CR 0.015 0.075∗ 0.117∗∗ 0.020 0.086∗∗ 0.115∗∗ 0.045 0.102∗∗ 0.138∗∗
(0.030) (0.042) (0.050) (0.030) (0.043) (0.049) (0.032) (0.048) (0.055)
FSAR 1.435∗∗∗ 2.184∗∗∗ 2.738∗∗∗ 1.438∗∗∗ 2.205∗∗∗ 2.775∗∗∗ 1.411∗∗∗ 2.190∗∗∗ 2.760∗∗∗
(0.232) (0.394) (0.537) (0.235) (0.398) (0.540) (0.239) (0.411) (0.562)
Std. Dev. CR 0.017 0.028 0.03 0.022 0.032 0.035 0.032 0.047∗ 0.055∗∗
(0.021) (0.024) (0.027) (0.018) (0.022) (0.025) (0.020) (0.025) (0.028)
Std. Dev. FSAR 0.186∗ 0.141 0.082 0.182∗ 0.137 0.078 0.172∗ 0.127 0.064
(0.097) (0.092) (0.088) (0.097) (0.092) (0.087) (0.103) (0.097) (0.091)
LOG(TNA) −0.001∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.001∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.001 −0.001 −0.001∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
TO −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001∗ −0.001∗ −0.001∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
EXP −0.59 −0.576 −0.56 −0.590 −0.567 −0.543 −0.637 −0.563 −0.504
(0.420) (0.416) (0.409) (0.419) (0.419) (0.414) (0.452) (0.453) (0.451)
LOG(1+NUMFDS) 0.003 0.003∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.003 0.003∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.003 0.003 0.003∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
STAR 0.002∗ 0.002∗ 0.002∗ 0.002∗ 0.002 0.002 0.002∗ 0.002∗ 0.002∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 11,103 11,103 11,103 11,103 11,103 11,103 11,123 11,123 11,123
R-Squared 0.085 0.088 0.087 0.086 0.089 0.088 0.084 0.088 0.087
4
6Table 12: Fund Manager Turnover by Management Company Performance and
Fund Performance
This table presents results from a logit model, where the dependent variable is a DEPART indicator
variable that equals one if an individual fund has a departing manager. For funds with multiple
managers, DEPART takes on unity if there is at least one manager who departs. The ﬁrst three
columns investigate departures of equity funds and the last three columns investigate departures of
managers of bond funds. The stock price performance of management companies is measured using
the average industry-adjusted returns over the prior 12, 24, and 36 months (CR). FR is the average
four-factor adjusted equity return over the past 36 months or the style-adjusted bond fund return
over the past 36 months. TO is the turnover ratio at the fund-level. EXP is the expense ratio at
the fund-level. STAR is an indicator variable that takes on unity if the fund is a star fund in the
previous month. In each month, we compute the average tenure (TENURE) of all managers
of the fund. TEAM is an indicator variable for whether the fund is a team managed fund.
Time dummies are included. Standard errors are clustered by fund and time. All independent
variables are lagged by one month. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, ***
represent statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Dependent Variable: Management Turnover
Equity Funds Bond Funds
12 Mths 24 Mths 36 Mths 12 Mths 24 Mths 36 Mths
CR −3.925∗∗∗ −3.941∗∗∗ −1.612 −2.147 −1.393 −0.096
(1.250) (1.504) (1.452) (1.681) (2.117) (2.141)
FR −8.866∗∗ −12.106∗∗∗ −14.896∗∗∗ −7.633 −4.926 −10.503
(3.637) (4.552) (4.637) (9.700) (14.585) (16.303)
LOG(TNA) 0.077∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ −0.861 −0.882
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
LOG(AGE) −0.060 −0.060 −0.050 −0.019 −0.014 −0.009
(0.078) (0.078) (0.078) (0.119) (0.120) (0.119)
TO 0.008 0.004 −0.003 −0.041∗ −0.042∗ −0.041∗
(0.034) (0.035) (0.036) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
EXP 4.213 3.909 3.842 −21.422∗ −21.392∗ −21.861∗
(6.244) (6.279) (6.305) (11.921) (11.942) (11.882)
STAR −0.270∗∗ −0.255∗∗ −0.249∗∗ −0.074 −0.078 −0.068
(0.118) (0.119) (0.117) (0.192) (0.194) (0.194)
LOG(TENURE) −1.013∗∗∗ −1.011∗∗∗ −1.012∗∗∗ −1.051∗∗∗ −1.052∗∗∗ −1.051∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037)
TEAM 0.525∗∗∗ 0.529∗∗∗ 0.529∗∗∗ 0.522∗∗∗ 0.525∗∗∗ 0.524∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.063) (0.064) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085)
Observations 94,870 94,870 94,870 55,817 55,817 55,817
R-Squared 0.150 0.149 0.149 0.160 0.160 0.160
47Table 13: Future Performance of Equity and Bond Funds by Management Com-
pany Performance (CR) and Fund Performance (FR)
The table independently sorts management companies into quartiles by their prior industry-adjusted
stock returns (CR) and by the adjusted return of their equity and bond funds (FR and FSAR).
Panel A summarizes the four-factor adjusted returns of equity funds in the subsequent month based
on the equity fund and company performance over the prior 12 months. Panel B summarizes the
style-adjusted returns of bond funds in the subsequent month based on the bond fund and company
performance over the prior 12 months. The sample period ranges from January 1992 to December
2009. The standard errors of the diﬀerences are clustered by time and fund and are shown in paren-
theses. *, **, and *** represent statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Panel A: Equity Funds Using Prior 12 Month Performance
ALL FR 1 FR 2 FR 3 FR 4 4-1
ALL −0.18∗∗∗ −0.15∗∗∗ −0.13∗∗∗ −0.07 0.11∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
CR 1 −0.16∗∗∗ −0.26∗∗∗ −0.19∗∗∗ −0.12∗∗ −0.07 0.19∗∗
(0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08)
CR 2 −0.12∗∗∗ −0.23∗∗∗ −0.13∗∗∗ −0.13∗∗∗ −0.03 0.20∗∗
(0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.09)
CR 3 −0.14∗∗∗ −0.13∗∗ −0.20∗∗∗ −0.13∗∗ −0.09 0.05
(0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07)
CR 4 −0.11∗∗∗ −0.12∗∗ −0.09∗ −0.14∗∗∗ −0.09 0.03
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.09)
4-1 0.05 0.15∗∗ 0.09∗ −0.02 −0.02
(0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07)
Panel B: Bond Funds Using Prior 12 Month Performance
ALL FSAR 1 FSAR 2 FSAR 3 FSAR 4 4-1
ALL −0.15∗∗∗ −0.00 0.04 0.08∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.06)
CR 1 −0.02 −0.24∗ 0.00 0.05 0.10∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗
(0.03) (0.13) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.14)
CR 2 −0.02 −0.15∗∗∗ −0.01 0.03∗ 0.04 0.19∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.07)
CR 3 −0.00 −0.11∗∗∗ 0.00 0.05∗∗∗ 0.05 0.16∗∗
(0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.06)
CR 4 0.02 −0.08 −0.01 0.02 0.11∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.05) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.07)
4-1 0.04 0.16 −0.01 −0.03 0.01
(0.04) (0.14) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
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